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Abstract 
 
Although researchers predominately test for linear relationships between variables, at times there 
may be theoretical and even empirical reasons for expecting nonlinear functions. We examined if 
the relation between intelligence (IQ) and perceived leadership might be more accurately 
described by a curvilinear single-peaked function. Following Simonton’s (1985) theory, we 
tested a specific model, indicating that the optimal IQ for perceived leadership will appear at 
about 1.2 standard deviations above the mean IQ of the group membership. The sample consisted 
of mid-level leaders from multinational private-sector companies. We used the leaders’ scores on 
the Wonderlic Personnel Test—a measure of IQ—to predict how they would be perceived on 
prototypically effective leadership (i.e., transformational and instrumental leadership). 
Accounting for the effects of leader personality, gender, age, as well as company, country, and 
time fixed effects, analyses indicated that perceptions of leadership followed a curvilinear 
inverted-U function of intelligence. The peak of this function was at an IQ score of about 120, 
which did not depart significantly from the value predicted by the theory. As the first direct 
empirical test of a precise curvilinear model of the intelligence-leadership relation, the results 
have important implications for future research on how leaders are perceived in the workplace.   
 
Keywords: perceived leadership; general intelligence; curvilinear functions; nonlinear functions; 
Wonderlic.   
  
INTELLIGENCE AND LEADERSHIP  3 
 
Can Super Smart Leaders Suffer From Too Much of a Good Thing? 
The Curvilinear Effect of Intelligence on Perceived Leadership Behavior 
 
 The classic American sex symbol Mae West is often quoted as saying “Too much of a 
good thing can be wonderful.” Yet too-much-of-a-good-thing effects are evident in various 
phenomena, most frequently in terms of consumption; as common knowledge suggests, excesses 
in everyday life are not always so wonderful. A glass or two of red wine each evening may help 
one’s heart more than being a teetotaler, but drinking a whole jug of rotgut each night will likely 
trigger cardiovascular disease (O'Keefe, Bybee, & Lavie, 2007). Such effects could also refer to 
individual difference characteristics, including weight, where below or above the optimal range 
can have deleterious effects (Flegal, Graubard, Williamson, & Gail, 2005). However, in this 
article, we will focus on excesses in a key psychological variable—general intelligence—and its 
impact on perceptions of leadership.  
Our main thesis is that even though researchers frequently hypothesize linear or more 
rarely monotonic relationships, as for instance with laws of diminishing returns (Mankiw, 2012), 
at times the empirically observed associations are actually curvilinear, yielding nonmonotonic 
curves with definite peaks or troughs. Creative achievement, for example, is often a curvilinear, 
roughly inverted-U function of psychopathological symptoms (Simonton, 2014). The outright 
mentally ill are seldom if ever creative, but individuals who exhibit certain subclinical traits, 
such as conspicuous cognitive disinhibition, may prove more creative than those persons who 
manifest the perfect image of mental health (Carson, 2014).  
 In the current investigation, we are interested in testing another curvilinear hypothesis, 
namely that leadership may also be a single-peaked function of general intelligence, with the 
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optimum appearing at the higher-than-average but not the highest levels of intellect. Our work 
adds to the literature on the link between intelligence and perceived leadership in two ways. 
First, we answer calls regarding examining “too-much-of-a-good-thing” phenomena 
(Pierce & Aguinis, 2013). With few exceptions (e.g., Simonton, 1985), theorizing a nonlinear 
effect of intelligence on leadership has been rare (see Edwards & Berry, 2010). This state of 
affairs is rather ironic given the amount of research and meta-analyses that have been conducted 
on the topic. For example, a recent review of the effects of personality and intelligence on work 
performance failed to consider possible curvilinear effects of intelligence (Schmitt, 2014). 
Although the linear effect of intelligence on perceived leader outcomes is significant—that is, the 
meta-analytic effect of objectively measured intelligence on subjective leader outcomes like 
perceived effectiveness is ρ = .17 (Judge, Colbert, & Ilies, 2004)—such results might obscure or 
even misrepresent the true effect of intelligence if the functional form of the relationship is 
misspecified (Ghiselli, 1963; Simonton, 1985).  
Second, to the extent that our study can shed some light onto the observed functional 
form suggests that our findings could have important implications for leader selection in 
organizations. That is, the optimal level of intelligence may not be at the highest spectrum of the 
intelligence distribution insofar as interpersonal leadership effectiveness is concerned.  
The Curvilinear Effect of Intelligence on Leader Behavior  
Because general intelligence enhances expertise acquisition, problem-solving ability, and 
articulate communication in a diversity of occupational positions (Gottfredson, 1997; Schmidt & 
Hunter, 1998), it should come as no surprise that meta-analyses have found intelligence to 
predict leader emergence and effectiveness (Judge, et al., 2004; Lord, De Vader, & Alliger, 
1986). However, as theorized by Simonton (1985) several decades ago, and again suggested 
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more recently by others (Judge, et al., 2004; Judge, Piccolo, & Kosalka, 2009) this relationship 
may not be linear but rather curvilinear (i.e., an inverted U shape).  
Individuals who are too intelligent vis-à-vis the group they lead may limit how effective 
they could be. The leaders may be limited because they: (a) present “more sophisticated 
solutions to problems [which] may be much more difficult to understand” (Simonton, 1985, p. 
536); (b) use “complex forms of verbal communication [and] expressive sophistication [that] 
may also undermine influence” (Simonton, 1985, p. 536); and (c) come across as too “cerebral” 
making them less prototypical of the group (cf. Hogg, 2001). This latter point is important to 
stress because leaders should be representative of the group they are leading. If they are too 
intellectual, they may appear to be socially aloof or too detached from the group. Important to 
note here is that we are talking about perceived—and not objective—ratings of leadership.  
What we suggest regarding a nonlinear intelligence-leadership relationship seems rather 
intuitive. Indeed, Simonton’s (1985) theory, which we describe in more detail below, very 
clearly lays out why the relationship between intelligence and perceived leadership effectiveness 
should be nonlinear, and provides specific predictions about this form of the relationship and the 
conditions under which they will hold. However, his theory has not yet been empirically tested.  
It is clear that conventional wisdom assumes and tests that the effect of intelligence on 
performance (in a general sense) is linear (Coward & Sackett, 1990). However, in a recent large-
scale study, Ganzach, Gotlibobski, Greenberg, and Pazy (2013) theorized and demonstrated 
otherwise with respect to the effect of intelligence on pay; these authors suggested that the 
studies that failed to detect nonlinear effects may have been underpowered. We agree, but the 
problem is more complex in other aspects too, particularly because a prevailing problem in our 
field is the failure to correct for endogeneity-related issues like measurement error as well as not 
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dealing correctly with the problem of omitted variables, which reduces statistical power and also 
biases coefficients (Antonakis, Bendahan, Jacquart, & Lalive, 2010); these issues will be 
exacerbated when attempting to detect nonlinear effects (McClelland & Judd, 1993). Thus, 
correctly accounting for what drives the variance in leadership (i.e., including all theoretical 
causes), correcting for measurement error, and then correctly modeling the form of the 
relationship should increase the likelihood of detecting a nonlinear effect, if one exists.  
Thus, as detailed below, we expect that the marginal effect of intelligence on ratings of 
prototypically good leadership will initially be strongly positive, but at a certain threshold this 
relation will taper off and even decline if the leader’s intelligence is too high. Simonton’s (1985) 
detailed theoretical analysis is particularly useful for the present investigation because it 
describes four alternative nonlinear models of the intelligence-leadership relation. Each 
successive model subsumes the previous model by inserting an additional assumption to render it 
more general in explanatory scope as well as more precise in its empirical predictions. In his 
theory, Simonton (1985) makes four assumptions concerning:  
1. the expected normal distribution of general intelligence in the population and in groups 
extracted from that population;  
2. the positive monotonic relation between intelligence and both problem-solving ability 
and communication sophistication;  
3. the differential emphasis of particular groups on either social-emotional or task-
oriented goals; and  
4. the intellectual stratification of groups so that groups vary in the average intelligence 
levels of their members (e.g., juvenile gangs versus national parliaments).  
We briefly explain each of the Simonton’s (1985) four models below, using his labelling.  
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Model 1: Intellectual superiority. The first Simonton model predicts a positive 
monotonic but decelerating relation between leader intelligence and effectiveness; that is, the 
relation increases rapidly, peaks and flattens out as explained by a “law of diminishing returns.” 
This model suggests that the higher an individual’s score is on intelligence, the more likely that 
this individual is able to influence others. This model assumes that only problem solving ability 
matters; thus the smarter one is, the more this individual will be perceived as an optimal problem 
solver by others (and thus accepted as the leader). To better understand the model, suppose that 
intelligence is normally distributed in the population (i.e., mean = 100 and SD = 16) and that a 
target individual is situated at a particular intelligence level (i.e., an IQ score of 100) in this 
distribution of intelligence scores. Calculating the area to the left of the normal curve shows what 
proportion of individuals will have a lower score than the target. An individual with a score at 
the mean would have a higher score than 50% of individuals; at 116 (i.e., +1 z score), however, 
the area increases to 84.13%. Thus an increase of 16 intelligence points increases the proportion 
of individuals that see the target as intellectually superior by 68.26% (i.e., from 50% to 84.13%). 
An increase, though from 116 to 132 intelligence points, increases the area from 84.13% to 
97.72% (i.e., a gain of 16.15%). As intelligence increases, less is gained and the curve goes from 
being positive to increasing flat, but is never negative (see figure in Simonton, 1985, p. 536).  
The remaining three models predict single-peaked functions (inverted U-shaped curve) 
with the optimum placed at different distances above the average.  
Model 2: Comprehension factor. The previous model assumes that individuals 
perceiving a potential leader can fully understand what the target says at all ranges of 
intelligence. However, in reality, such an assumption may not hold. Too large a gap between the 
intellectual inferiors and the leader reduces the leader’s ability to influence because intellectual 
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inferiors may not comprehend the message or the solutions proposed by the leader, which makes 
the leader less prototypical. It is important to note that this model suggests that leaders honestly 
signal their level of intelligence; that is they do not “dumb down” the message to appeal to less 
smart individuals because doing so may seem (a) condescending to intellectual inferiors, or (b) 
as unsophisticated to peers and smarter individuals. Also, if high-intelligence leaders did 
simplify the message to make it comprehensible to all, and if the message were accepted by 
intellectual superiors and inferiors, then comprehensibility is irrelevant, making Model 1 more 
generalizable. According to Model 2, the maximum limit in comprehension between individuals 
in different intelligence strata is about 1 SD (i.e., 16 IQ points). Thus, the highest potential to 
influence, as measured by the total area under the normal distributed curve of intelligence, is at 
108 points (where the area, between 92 to 108 points, which we call the “comprehension 
proportion,” is 38.30%; see Table 1 of Simonton, 1985). This model is particularly useful in 
situations where socio-emotional needs, and not task needs, are most important.  
Model 3: Criticism factor. The first two models do not consider the influence of rivals, 
particularly intellectual superiors, in the leadership influence process. Thus, a leader of a group 
must have a sufficient level of intelligence so as to not be challenged by others who could appear 
to be more competent. To better understand the prediction of this model, an individual having an 
intelligence score of 116 is smarter than 84.13% of individuals in the distribution of scores; 
however, this individual is vulnerable to the 15.87% of individuals having a higher score (we 
refer to this percentage as the “criticism proportion”). Model 3 assumes that the degree to which 
an individual can influence depends on an increasing difference between the “comprehension 
proportion” and the “criticism proportion”; subtracting these two proportions shows that the peak 
of intelligence should be at 119 points (i.e., + 1.2 SDs from the mean). Thus, according to this 
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model, in addition to how followers perceive the leader, it is important to consider peer and boss 
perceptions because they are likely to be a source of challenge to the target leader.  
Model 4: Intellectual stratification: Of special interest is the last and most general 
nonlinear model. This model assumes that groups of individuals, in different vocations, are 
stratified insofar as their intelligence is concerned; in the workplace, different occupations have 
different demands with respect to the complexity of job requirements. This model suggests that 
the optimal level of intelligence must bear in mind the precepts of Model 3 but also consider the 
average intelligence of the group being led. Thus, the higher the mean intelligence is of a group, 
the higher is the optimal level of intelligence of the leader. For example, if the mean of a group is 
at 110 IQ points, then following directly from the precepts of Model 3 regarding the difference 
between the comprehension and criticism proportions, the optimal level of intelligence will be 
about 1.2 standard deviations above the group mean (i.e., about 129 IQ points).  
With respect to the current study and the predictions of Model 4, expressed 
approximately in terms of IQ scores (with SD = 15, given that we scale the intelligence test we 
used to the Wechsler intelligence test norms), the leader’s ideal IQ should be about 18 points 
higher than the mean IQ for the group which he or she must lead. This prediction results when 
social-emotional and task-oriented goals have more or less equal weight (as also assumed by 
Ames & Flynn, 2007). For the sample used in the current study, we assume the mean intelligence 
score in the population is 100 and that IQ is normally distributed in the population. Given that we 
studied middle managers, we will also assume that the average subordinate—in the firms we 
studied—has an intelligence score of about 108 (i.e., at least a highschool diploma and working 
in a clerical position, Simonton, 1985); for the intelligence test we used, the publisher reports 
that mean scores of clerks to general office workers is about 106 (between 104-108 IQ points or 
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22-24 Wonderlic points, see Wonderlic, 2002, p. 14). We therefore expect that the relation of 
intelligence to leadership will top out at leader intelligence scores of about 124 (i.e., 106 + 18). 
To be sure, in Simonton’s (1985) theoretical analysis, if the group’s emphasis is more on social-
emotional goals, then the expected IQ gap would be smaller, and if more on task-oriented goals 
the gap would be larger. While keeping that nicety in mind, we will nonetheless test the 
following hypothesis:  
H1: Leader intelligence will predict prototypical leadership according to a curvilinear 
inverted U function with a peak at about 124 IQ points.   
Assessing Leadership According to Follower Perceptions 
Before continuing with the design of the study, we first define the leadership criterion. 
Leadership is a very complex phenomenon that can be given dramatically contrasting operational 
definitions. Moreover, alternative criteria may yield different results in testing the foregoing 
hypothesis. A striking illustration may be found in the research on the leadership of United States 
presidents (Simonton, 2012). Even if overall presidential performance appears to be a positive 
monotonic function of the leader’s intellectual brilliance, the leader’s popularity with the voters 
exhibits a more ambivalent relationship so that the brightest presidents enter office with 
narrowest margins of electoral victory. Gibb (1969) once cynically expressed the general 
conclusion that, “The evidence suggests that every increment of intelligence means wiser 
government, but that the crowd prefers to be ill-governed by people it can understand” (p. 218).  
Therefore, in this study we will operationalize “leadership” according to the perceptions 
of individuals observing the leader, including followers, peers, and superiors. Using this 
composition of observers to measure leadership perceptions is important for the theoretical 
predictions of Model 4 to hold (i.e., which incorporate both the comprehension and criticism 
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factor). We use the Antonakis-House (2014) “fuller” full-range leadership model, which in 
addition to transformational, transactional, and laissez-faire leadership, includes a class of leader 
behavior termed “instrumental leadership.” The latter leader behavior is predicated on the 
leader’s expertise focusing on strategic (i.e., organizational) and work facilitation (followers) 
functions. Although instrumental leadership is mostly task focused, its effects on follower 
satisfaction are as strong as those of transformational leadership, which can be characterized as 
more of a socio-emotional leader style. Antonakis and House (2014) theorized that active-
constructive leader behaviors, and in particular instrumental leadership, may be key to raising 
follower self-efficacy belief and task performance; in this way, instrumental leaders help 
followers succeed, which makes these styles of leadership highly satisfactory. Thus, given that 
we are gauging perceptions of leadership we expect this style to be predicted by leader 
intelligence in the same way as will be transformational leadership. 
The factors of instrumental and transformational leadership, along with contingent reward 
leadership are seen as being highly prototypical of effective leaders (the “active-constructive” 
styles). However, active and passive management-by-exception (i.e., “corrective forms”), as well 
as laissez faire leadership, are seen as indicative of highly ineffective leaders and are thus 
nonprototypical styles (Antonakis & House, 2014). Given that we expect intelligence to predict 
the prototypical factors as indicated in our affirmed hypothesis, it follows therefore, that the 
opposite should occur for the non-prototypical factors. That is, a perceived ineffective leader 
would be one having too low or too high intelligence. For those factors we expect a U-shape 
relation in that being too high or too low on intelligence would be associated with a high score 
on the nonprototypical factors. Thus, individuals at the optimum level of intelligence will score 
lowest on the non-prototypical factors. Following the above, we test the following hypothesis:  
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H2: Leader intelligence will predict nonprototypical leadership according to a 
curvilinear U function with a trough at about 124 IQ points. 
Method 
Sample 
Approval to gather the data was provided by the research ethics committee of the Faculty 
of Business and Economics at the University of Lausanne. We studied 379 leaders (26.39% 
women; mean age of the leaders = 38.34 years, SD = 6.39) on whom we obtained ratings on 
leadership as well as several individual differences predictors. The sample of mid-level leaders 
were drawn from nine different groups composed of seven multinational private-sector 
companies (n = 351) and two cohorts of working leaders (n = 28) attending an executive 
education course. The leaders were distributed across 30 countries, mostly from Switzerland (n = 
139), The Netherlands (n = 37), UK (n = 27), France (n = 23), Germany (n = 23), Sweden (n = 
24), Greece (n = 14), Ireland (n = 12), and U.S.A. (n = 12). These data overlap with data 
published by Antonakis and House (2014, see Study 4), who examined a different phenomenon.  
We collected the data on the leaders over a course of six years. To avoid selection effects 
and hence biased ratings, we requested the human resources office of the companies in which the 
leaders were employed to provide us with the contact details of about 12 raters per leader from 
mostly their subordinates (i.e., n = 6-8), but also from some peers (i.e., n = 3-4), and their 
supervisor; we asked that the raters must be representative (in this way participants leaders could 
not select those individuals from whom they would expect to receive good ratings).  
We obtained ratings of leadership from 2,905 raters (i.e., 7.66 raters per leader; note, 
because of a very small degree of missing data on leadership ratings, the total raters on the 
leadership scales ranged from 2,896 to 2,905). To reduce the likelihood of rating leniency 
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(Antonioni, 1994) the raters participated anonymously and no rater identifiers were recorded. 
Participating companies (and percentage of participant leaders) included firms from banking 
(6.33%), insurance (38.79%), food manufacturing (26.65%), telecommunications and high-
technology (13.46%), hospitality and retail (7.39%), and other (7.39%).  
As indicated below in describing the measures, we did not gather data on intelligence 
from all participants because at times it was not practical to do so (i.e., depending on logistical or 
time constraints). Thus, we sought to obtain the maximum data possible from the nine groups. 
We gathered data, per group in the following years (year underlined indicates data on 
intelligence alongside all other individual difference measures were gathered; year non-
underlined means data on intelligence was not gathered, but all other individuals difference data 
were gathered): Group 1 (Year 2, Year 3), Group 2 (Year 4), Group 3 (Year 1, Year 2, Year 3, 
Year 4, Year 5, Year 6), Group 4 (Year 3), Group 5 (Year 5), Group 6 (Year 1), Group 7 (Year 
1), Group 8 (Year 5, Year 6), Group 9 (Year 5). Thus, from 16 data gathering opportunities, we 
obtained data on intelligence 8 times; this difference in distribution was not significant, 
according to Fisher’s exact test (p = .55). Consequently, data for all leaders on all variables (i.e., 
from listwise deletion) was available for 171 out of the 379 leaders (from 4 firms, 25 countries, 
and over 4 years).  
Measures 
 Leadership. We used “other” ratings of leadership, aggregated at the leader level. These 
ratings were complete by raters on-line prior to the leaders attending the workshop. The ratings 
included the nine factors of the Multifactor Leadership Questionnaire and four factors of 
instrumental leadership (for full descriptions of the scales, see Antonakis, Avolio, & 
Sivasubramaniam, 2003; Antonakis & House, 2014). Specifically, we measured (a) five factors 
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of transformational leadership including attributed idealized influence, behavioral idealized 
influence, inspirational motivation, intellectual stimulation, individualized consideration, (b) 
three factors of transactional leadership including contingent reward leadership, management-by-
exception active, and management-by-exception passive, (c) laissez-faire leadership, and (d) four 
factors of instrumental leadership including environmental monitoring, strategy formulation and 
implementation, path-goal facilitation, and outcome monitoring. The majority of raters 
completed the questionnaire in English (77.87%), with some responding in French (16.21%) or 
German (5.92%); we took the appropriate safeguards to ensure translation equivalence by 
translating the questions to the target language using one translator and then independently back 
again to the original language using another translator and then reconciling differences to ensure 
lingual equivalence; thereafter a fluent speaker in the target language reviewed the translation 
and adjustments were made if required (see Maneesriwongul & Dixon, 2004). 
Intelligence. Leaders completed a measure of general intelligence in English—the 
Wonderlic Personnel Test (Wonderlic, 2002)—under supervised conditions (i.e., at the beginning 
of the workshop) and with a fixed time constraint of 12 minutes. The Wonderlic test is a well 
validated measure of intelligence and correlates very highly with established intelligence 
measures such as the WAIS (e.g., Dodrill & Warner, 1988). The mean score of our leaders for 
the listwise sample was 25.31 (SD = 6.22) or about 111 IQ points; for the full sample (using 
maximum likelihood for missing data) it was 25.87 (SD = 6.27). Wonderlic scores can be 
converted to Wechsler Advanced Intelligence Scale (WAIS) scores by using the following 
approximation: WAIS = Wonderlic*2+60 (Dodrill, 1981). The scores of the leaders were 
approximately normally distributed (see Figure 1); this distribution is a good sign given the 
assumptions made by Simonton (1985) with respect to the distribution of scores being normal; 
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moreover, this result shows that the leaders were probably not directly selected on the basis of 
their intelligence scores (indeed, none of the companies reported using intelligence scores for 
selection).  
Note, the SD we report is lower than the unrestricted SD of 7.26 that Sackett and 
Ostgaard (1994) advise to be used for corrections to range restriction; these authors suggest that 
it would be prudent to correct for range restriction if norms were available to calculate the 
unrestricted SD. Although our data may have been influenced by indirect range restriction, 
because the sample is composed from individuals from different countries, such norms were not 
available; thus we used the raw data (though we do correct for the effects of measurement error 
as well as for the fixed-effects of country, company and time, as discussed below, which should 
increase statistical power). Not correcting for range restriction “goes against” finding support for 
our hypotheses in that in addition to attenuating linear relations, the effect of range restriction on 
nonlinear relations can be even more pronounced (Pierce & Aguinis, 2013). Formulas for 
correcting for range restriction in the context of multiple regression do exist but most assume 
linear functional forms in the relation (Held & Foley, 1994); although there are formulas for 
corrections in nonlinear models it appears that the cure may be worse than the disease in cases 
where the sample size is small or the main effect weak (Gross & Fleischman, 1987). Still, that 
the range restriction is not too severe and the distribution of scores is approximately normal, and 
because we included all theoretical causes and fixed effects, suggests that we should compensate 
for some of the biasing effects of indirect range restriction.  
[Figure 1 here] 
Individual difference control variables. We measured personality, to correctly model 
the multivariate effects of individual differences (Judge, Bono, Ilies, & Gerhardt, 2002; Zaccaro, 
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2012); thus, prior to attending the leadership workshop, participant leaders completed the 240 
item NEO-PI self-personality assessment in English (Costa & McCrae, 1992). We also measured 
leader gender, given that differences on the full-range model have been found between men and 
women (Eagly, Johannesen-Schmidt, & van Engen, 2003), as well as for age, which is a good 
proxy for experience (Antonakis, 2011). Including all theoretical predictors ensures that we 
maximize statistical power and minimize omitted variable bias. 
Fixed-effects controls. There may be unobserved factors common to groups of leaders 
that may correlate with the variables under study (i.e., regressors and outcomes). For instance, 
leaders in some cultures may use a particular leadership style more frequently than do leaders in 
another. Company culture may also play a role in selection and socialization, which may affect 
what is considered normative leader behavior. The year in which the data were gathered may 
also play a role for a variety of reasons: for instance, recruitment practices of companies may 
change, training programs may change, or macroeconomic factors may affect the labor market, 
and so forth, all which could determine how leaders may influence followers. Thus, we used 
dummy variables to control for these company, country, and time fixed-effects to capture any 
unobserved heterogeneity due to these factors (Antonakis, et al., 2010; Bollen & Brand, 2010; 
Halaby, 2004). These factors are, of course, mostly exogenous to any particular leader. 
Estimation Method 
Our independent variables were not perfectly reliable; that is, they were measured with 
error, which affects estimate consistency. A consistent estimator is one that converges 
asymptotically to the true population value as sample size increases (Kennedy, 2008); apart from 
biasing coefficients of the ill-measured variable, measurement error can also bias estimates of 
other variables in the model (Antonakis, et al., 2010; Bollen, 1989). Thus, we undertook 
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corrective procedures to model the independent variables measured with error as latent. We 
modeled the latent variables using the scale indexes as single indicators of their respective latent 
variable and placed an appropriate constraint, as a function of the indicator’s reliability on the 
disturbance of the respective indicator (see Bollen, 1989); because we report standardized 
results, we also corrected for measurement error in the same way in all the dependent variables.  
We used the population reliabilities of the measures to correct for measurement error in 
personality (Costa & McCrae, 1992). For intelligence, we used a mid-range value of .85 for the 
first order term (cf. Wonderlic, 2002); thus, the reliability of the quadratic term was .7225 
(Dimitruk, Schermelleh-Engel, Kelava, & Moosbrugger, 2007). For the outcome variables we 
used the observed alpha reliability coefficients. We did not assume perfect reliability for age 
given that it can be misreported or incorrectly keyed (Mason & Cope, 1987). Thus, on the basis 
of the Whipple index we modeled the reliability of age to be .96 for the full sample (i.e., 1 – 
(1.04 – 1.00)/1.04) and .98 for the listwise sample (i.e., 1 – (1.02 – 1.00)/1.02); these reliability 
values can be conceptualized as the proportion of true variance (Bollen, 1989). We modeled the 
rest of the variables (i.e., gender and the fixed-effects) as perfectly observed (i.e., fully reliable).  
We used Stata’s (2015) structural equation modeling program, estimating the model 
simultaneously for the 13 leadership styles and 2 outcomes1. With simultaneous estimation one 
can correlate the disturbances of the dependent variables, akin to multivariate regression (or 
MANOVA), which improves estimation efficiency and also allows cross-equation tests.  
We estimated the following model, at the leader level, for the 15 dependent variables (z), 
adding in the following fixed-effects as per the listwise sample for year T, firm F, and country C:  
                                                 
1As suggested by a reviewer, we also examined how intelligence related to two leader outcomes variables: 
Effectiveness of the leader and satisfaction in the leader. We report these results in the robustness checks. To ensure 
maximum efficiency in estimation, we estimated all models including the 15 dependent variables simultaneously.  
  
INTELLIGENCE AND LEADERSHIP  18 
 
 =  + 	
	 +		 +  +  +  +  +  + 
+  + ! 

 "
+#$%$

$"
+  &''

'"
+ 	; 	) ∈ +1, 15/ 
Eq. 1 
Where female = 1 (else 0 = male), age = age, N = neuroticism, E = Extraversion, O = 
Openness, A = Agreeableness, C = Conscientiousness, IQ = WPT score, IQ2 = squared WPT 
score, and e is a disturbance term (note, age, the personality variables, intelligence and the 
outcome variables are modelled as latent). Given our theory and hypothesis, the coefficients in 
which we are interested in are , which should be positive, and , which should be negative 
(in fact, only the latter term is required to be significant, cf. Bedeian & Mossholder, 1994). 
Because of the inclusion of a quadric term for intelligence (to capture the hypothesized 
inverse U shape), to facilitate the interpretation of the simple main effect of intelligence on 
outcomes, we first standardized the Wonderlic scores (which is akin to centering for rescaling 
purposes), and then generated the squared term; in this way, the coefficient of the main effect 
represents the standardized simple slope at the mean value of Wonderlic scores (Aiken & West, 
1991; Friedrich, 1982). Standardizing the linear term before generating the quadratic term is an 
important asset given the fact we used measurement error correction; thus, this procedure ensures 
that the independent errors assumption holds for the correlated terms.  
Results 
Missing data analysis 
 We first report analyses regarding the missing data. Because data were missing only on 
one variable (IQ), we could not directly test the assumption of MCAR—missing completely at 
random (Little, 1988). Thus, using the full sample we created a variable “missing” coded 0 for 
when data is complete, or 1 otherwise and regressed the seven fully-measured leader individual-
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difference characteristics (i.e., personality, gender and age) on the variable “missing” and all the 
fixed-effects (of country, company, and time) (Kline, 2015); the variable “missing” was 
unrelated both individually and jointly (χ2(7) = 3.57, p = .83) to any of the individual difference 
measures. The same results were evident in predicting “missing” from the rest of the variables.   
As a further test, we examined the MCAR assumption (Li, 2013) by performing two 
Monte Carlo simulations. To do so, we need to have at least a second variable having missing 
data; if both intelligence and the second variable are missing at random, the joint MCAR test 
should be nonsignificant. We thus chose the variable agreeableness, because it was strongly 
related to the leadership variables (reported below). Given that this variable had full cases, we 
made some of its values missing; to give the test sufficient power, we randomly deleted 208 
cases from agreeableness resulting in 171 observations for this variable as well. We performed 
the simulation 5,000 times each, assuming unequal variances for the missing variables. In the 
first simulation we only examined the two variables alone. Results indicated that the mean p-
value of the MCAR χ2(4) test was .50 (SE  = .004; the 95% confidence interval was between .49 
to .51). Out of the 5,000 simulations, the test was only significant 259 times (5.18%). In the 
second simulation, we conditioned the two variables with missing data on the rest of the variable 
on which we have full cases (i.e., the rest of the individual differences and fixed-effects). The 
mean p-value of the MCAR χ2(94) test was .86 (SE  = .003; the 95% confidence interval was 
between .85 to .87). Out of the 5,000 simulations, the test was only significant 18 times (0.36%).  
Thus, overall, the listwise sample with full observations appears to be MCAR. Still, in 
reporting, we include too results from the full sample using Stata’s MLMV estimator—
maximum likelihood estimator for missing data in the event that data are MAR or missing at 
random (which is not testable); the MLMV estimator is still consistent under MAR assumptions 
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(Schafer & Graham, 2002). For this this model, we controlled for the fixed-effects (using dummy 
variables) of only fully observed data given that the observations that are missing are perfectly 
collinear with the rest of the omitted fixed effects.  
Aggregation 
Because our theory is at the leader level, we model aggregate perceptions of raters 
regarding the target leader; we therefore used the intraclass correlation coefficient, ICC1 (Bliese, 
2000), to justify aggregation of the rater data to the leader level. For the full sample, the mean 
ICC1 for the dependent variables was .16 (the 95% confidence interval of the ICC’s ranged from 
a low of .15 to a high of .18); the mean ICC2 was .60 (the 95% confidence interval of the ICC’s 
ranged from a low of .57 to a high of .62). For the listwise sample, the mean ICC1 was .16 (the 
95% confidence interval of the ICC’s ranged from a low of .14 to a high of .19); the mean ICC2 
was .58 (the 95% confidence interval of the ICC’s ranged from a low of .54 to a high of .63). The 
ICC results (Bliese, 2000; Cicchetti, 1994) coupled with the F-statistics for the ANOVA model, 
which were highly significant (p < .001), indicate that ratings could be aggregated. Note, because 
some leaders were rated by followers who did not all use the same response language, we used 
modal response; if there was more than one modal response language we used the following 
decision rule to extract the mode: English > French > German.  
We report the descriptive statistics for the aggregated data in Table 1 both for the full 
sample and for the listwise sample.  
[Table 1] 
Intelligence and Leadership 
The results reported here refer to the listwise sample (Table 2), unless noted otherwise; 
when we refer to the “full” sample it concerns the results reported from the MLMV estimator 
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(Table 3). The two estimators provided very similar results. The average absolute difference 
between the first and the second estimator on the structural coefficients of all individual-
difference variables was .07; we found the same average difference for the main and quadratic 
effect of IQ. These differences are, for most intents and purposes immaterial. We thus report 
detailed results from the listwise estimator, and corroborate them when relevant with that of the 
MLMV estimator. Moreover, for all samples, we report results at the .10 level of significance to 
ensure that we do not miss potentially interesting findings, particularly given the difficulty in 
detecting nonlinear effects (McClelland & Judd, 1993). We also report the z statistic for all 
estimates. Interested readers can use this information to calculate confidence intervals for the 
upper (+) and lower (-) bound as follows:  ± 1 ∗ 1.96. 
The models predicted a large portion of the variance in the leadership measures. The 
individual difference variables (i.e., age, gender, personality, and intelligence) had an average R2 
of .22 or a multiple R = .47 (see rows R2I in Tables 2 & 3). The maximum amount of variance 
that could be predicted from the leaders only can be estimated from the panel model (with i 
raters nested under j leaders) using the fixed-effects of leaders (i.e., dummy variables); doing so 
captures all between leader differences whether observed or not and this result indicated an 
average R2 of .40 (see rows R2P in Tables 2 & 3). Thus, the measured individual differences 
predicted on average 56.68% (calculation from four decimals, i.e., .2243/.3957) of the maximum 
variance in the leadership styles due to leader individual differences. Our full specification with 
the time, company, and country-level fixed-effects had an average R2 of .55, or a multiple R of 
.74. These results highlight why accounting for these fixed-effects is important (Halaby, 2004) 
and demonstrates that our models have rather strong explanatory power (see rows R2F in Tables 
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2 & 3). Note, majority rater response language made no difference at all to estimation (thus we 
excluded these dummy variables from estimation to ensure maximum efficiency).  
 [Tables 2 & 3] 
As for intelligence, the main effect on the ten active constructive leadership styles (i.e., 
transformational, contingent reward, and instrumental leadership) was positive. As concerns the 
significance of the quadratic term on the effective leader styles (i.e., transformational, contingent 
reward, and instrumental leadership), it was negatively predictive and significant eight of ten 
times (seven at p < .05 and one at p < .10), thus demonstrating incremental validity. In terms of 
incremental validity across all the leadership styles, the main effect of intelligence only added on 
average .0054 to the prediction beyond the rest of the individual difference factors. The quadratic 
effect added much more, beyond the main effect of intelligence to the R2, that is, on average 
.0343 (for the full sample the increase was on average .0543). We did not find significant effects 
of IQ on transactional or laissez-faire leadership. With respect to the curvilinearity arguments we 
made, these results mostly support H1 (regarding the prototypically good leadership styles) but 
not H2 (the prototypically bad leadership styles).  
The mean standardized simple main effect of intelligence (i.e., at the mean of leader 
intelligence) is shown in the main effect of the coefficient of IQ in Table 2: Across the eight 
styles they averaged β = .33 (SE = .13, z = 2.42, p < .05). For the five transformational leadership 
styles, the mean across the styles was β = .34 (SE = .14, z = 2.39, p < .05) and for the three 
instrumental leadership styles the mean across the styles was β = .31 (SE = .14, z = 2.26, p < 
.05); the mean standardized simple main effects of intelligence on transformational and 
instrumental leadership were not significantly different from each other (χ2(1) = .08, p > .10). 
Results were similar for the full sample. 
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To provide a better understanding of the nonlinear nature of the relationship between 
intelligence and leadership, we graphed the predicted value of two instrumental leadership and 
two transformational factors (holding the rest of the covariates, in the respective models, 
constant at their means). As indicated in Figure 2, the relationship of intelligence to leader style 
is initially strongly positive; after hitting a peak, the relationship does not benefit in terms of a 
marginal difference and starts becoming negative.  
To understand the precise nature of the functional form for the models where the 
quadratic term was significant, we probed the interaction. The first derivative with respect to 
intelligence for the function  +	 shows where the curve is flat (i.e., the peak of the 
function where the slope is zero) at a value of IQ = 6178179. We report these results in Table 4. The 
mean value at which the curve is flat across these leader styles is at a Wonderlic score of 30.05 
(or 120 IQ points); for the full sample the peak for the significant factors was about 29.26. 
[Figure 2, Table 4] 
We can also estimate the slope at different points of the curve at particular values of IQ 
using the following formula:  +2 ∗ ; the estimation the SE of the slope at specific points 
is done using the delta method (see Oehlert, 1992). The standardized mean slope at a Wonderlic 
score of 23 (IQ score 106) is very strong and significant (β = .55). However, the standardized 
mean slope at a Wonderlic score of 35 (i.e., a WAIS IQ score of 128) is negative, and overall 
significant (β = -.37). Thus, we see strong positive slopes at low levels of intelligence that taper 
off and become flat at Wonderlic scores of about 30 points (i.e., 120 IQ points); then the curve 
becomes significantly negative as intelligence increases to very high levels (e.g., at 35 Wonderlic 
points, β = -.61), supporting our Hypothesis 1 regarding the inverted U-shaped function.  
The mean slope, across all the leadership factors, at the inflection point we theorized (i.e., 
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at 124 IQ points or 32.5 Wonderlic points), was significantly negative for two factors only 
(though overall the mean β = -.37, p < .10). As an alternative test we examined the joint test of 
each individual slope being different from zero (i.e., zero as a scalar). Results showed that, 
indeed, overall these slopes could not be distinguished from zero, χ2(8) = 6.12, p = .63. As a 
stronger test we examined whether the slope for each leadership factor at 32.5 Wonderlic points 
(i.e., 124 IQ points) jointly differed from the slope at each of the respect inflection points listed 
in column 1 of Table 4; although this latter slope is zero, it still does have a standard error, which 
reflects the degree of uncertainty in the estimate. Again, results indicated that the joint test was 
not significant, χ2(8) = 10.85, p > .21. Thus, our theorizing suggested a flat slope at 32.5 
Wonderlic points but we found it to be at about 30 Wonderlic points. Although this difference 
was within sampling error, it does not wholly contradict our theorizing; however, this finding 
does question somewhat our theoretical precision in that the inflection point of IQ, at least for the 
types of samples we studied is probably slightly lower than originally theorized by Simonton 
(1985). We return to this seeming discrepancy in the Discussion. 
Control Variables and Leadership 
As for the control variables, we confirmed findings from the literature, but wish to 
highlight two interesting results: Being a female was overall positively and significantly related 
to the 10 active-constructive styles of leadership (β = .15, SE = .07, z = 2.19, p < .05). Age, a 
good indicator for leader experience, was a reasonably good but not very strong predictor of 
effective leader styles (see Fiedler, 1970). The average relation with the active-constructive 
styles (transformational, contingent reward, and instrumental leadership) was weak (β = .15, SE 
= .09, z = 1.74, p = .08); and, the average relation with corrective-passive styles (management by 
exception active and passive as well as laissez-faire leadership) was also weak but positive and 
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significant (β = .12, SE = .06, z = 1.99, p < .05).  
Robustness Checks 
Omitting the fixed effects: We report estimates of the individual differences without 
including all the fixed-effects in the models. As indicated in Appendix Table 1, the results for the 
curvilinear effect of intelligence still held, and were even more significant, showing that the 
effects of intelligence in the full model were not driven by the inclusion of the fixed-effects. 
Within-sample variability: The within-leader sample sizes from which we aggregated 
the data vary; that is, there is a different amount of raters for each leader. We therefore re-
estimated the models using analytic weights (StataCorp, 2015), whereby those leaders who were 
rated by more followers will have a greater weight in model estimation. Such a procedure makes 
sense because observations with more raters are more accurate; thus, such a procedure will 
produce more realistic findings if, for instance, we have possible outlier ratings based on few 
raters. The weighting we used is the inverse of the variance of the observation’s disturbance, that 
is, :
;
<= , where >? is the number of raters. Note, analytic weights cannot be used with SEM; thus, 
we estimated the models using errors-in-variables regression, a least-squares procedure that can 
accommodate measurement errors in the independent variables only (Draper & Smith, 1998; 
Kmenta, 1986); however, because we cannot correlate the disturbances of the dependent 
variables (as with SEM or MANOVA), this estimator is less efficient.  
Results indicated that the negative quadratic effect for intelligence was still significant for 
three of the five transformational styles and three of the four instrumental styles. As another 
alternative, we also estimated the model at the individual level, using maximum likelihood 
random effects (i.e., two-level) regression. We could not get the estimator to converge when 
including latent variables; these models are computationally very difficult to fit and we tried 
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various procedures both with Stata and Mplus, including using numerical integration. Thus, we 
modeled all regressors as observed. Results showed a significant negative quadratic effect for 
four of the five transformational factors and three of the four instrumental factors.  
Using a “super” transformational and instrumental scale: The subfactors of 
transformational and instrumental leadership are differentially predicted by the individual 
differences; also, they have unique effects on outcomes as has been established in large-scale 
studies (Antonakis & House, 2014). Still, although not isomorphic, the subfactors correlate quite 
strongly with each other (i.e., @̅ = .63 for the transformational and  @̅ = .56 for the instrumental 
scales, uncorrected for unreliability). Thus, for parsimony, we averaged the respective subfactors 
into a “transformational” and “instrumental” index, and restimated all models. The results 
corroborated what we found previously with respect to the expected nonlinear effect of 
intelligence (see Appendix Table 2). The quadric effect was significant and added incremental 
variance in predicting both (a) transformational, where it added .0505 (in the listwise) and .0816 
(in the full sample) to the R-square and (b) instrumental leadership, wherein it added .0553 (in 
the listwise) and .1181 (in the full sample) to the R-square. The peaks of the functions were 
similar to what we found when examining the factors constituting transformational and 
instrumental leadership; that is, the peak was 30.36 Wonderlic points (121 IQ points) for the 
former and 28.87 (118 IQ points) for the latter leadership style. Refer to Table 4 for details. 
Effect on leader outcomes: Although we have modelled rater perceptions of 
prototypically good leadership, we examined if the curvilinear effect also hold for leader 
outcomes. We used the “satisfaction with leader” and “leader effectiveness” outcomes, as 
measured in the Multifactor Leadership Questionnaire. Results confirmed that the curvilinear 
effect held too for these outcomes (see Appendix Table 2). The peaks of the functions, where the 
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slope is zero were at 29.74 Wonderlic points for satisfaction and 29.47 Wonderlic points for 
effectiveness . Again, these inflection points were very similar to those we report in for the 
hypotheses tests. Refer to Table 4 for details. 
Outlier analysis: Although relative to the median sample size (approximately n = 173) 
reported in this journal (Shen et al., 2011) our sample size is still respectable for the listwise 
sample (n  = 171), it is possible that outliers may have biased the results. We examined whether 
our results still held up following visual inspection and also after running tests; of course, given a 
multivariate model, in which measurement error and fixed-effects are included, it is possible that 
visual inspection provides a specious diagnosis (i.e., because after statistical adjustment and 
measurement error correction, the supposed “outlier” might not actually be one). Thus, we first 
used the BACON algorithm to identify and test for outliers in multivariate data (Billor, Hadi, & 
Velleman, 2000). Results indicated that none of the observations were outliers.  
As an alternative, we used the Median Absolute Deviation procedure suggested by Leys, 
Ley, Klein, Bernard and Licata (2013), which indicated that the range of acceptable values for 
the Wonderlic scores was between 6 to 42. The range for our dataset was 11 to 43, implying the 
possibility of one outlier. Even though the BACON algorithm suggested no outliers, we reran the 
results without the one potential outlier observation. The quadratic effect for intelligence 
remained significant and actually strengthened (the effect for outcome monitoring was 
significant too at p < .05). To examine whether omitting this observation significantly changed 
results, we reran the results again without this observation; we estimated a constrained SEM, 
wherein we omitted the particular observation and fixed the structural estimates for all the 
individual-difference variables to be those estimated from the full listwise sample (i.e., the 
estimates reported in Tables 2, and those for the two outcomes). If the outlier significantly 
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changed estimates (outside of random sampling), then the χ2 test of fit (i.e., the likelihood ratio 
test of fit) should detect this misfit and suggest that the constraints do not hold. Results for this 
test were nonsignificant. Next, we inspected the data for what can be characterized as “unusual” 
observations (Buis & Babigumira, 2010). Two observations qualified as such. We repeated the 
constrained SEM procedure and results were nonsignificant again. Given these checks, we can 
be reasonably confident that the unusual observation(s) did not significantly bias results 
(Aguinis, Gottfredson, & Joo, 2013).  
In addition, although we tested a very specific hypothesis based on ex-ante theory it may 
be that we overfitted the data—that is, modelling idiosyncrasies in the data (i.e., noise) by 
including too many variables and thus capitalizing on chance (Pitt, Myung, & Zhang, 2002). We 
thus examined how well the full model predicted the data “out of sample” (Meese & Rogoff, 
1983); we also compared the performance of this model to that of the model without intelligence. 
This testing procedure predicts the dependent variable of a particular observation (np) by using a 
subset of the data, in this case the rest of the observations (nr), to fit the model. Once the 
parameters from nr are obtained, they are used to generate the prediction for the dependent 
variable in np. This from of cross-validation is k-fold validation but where k = n (i.e., the sample 
size), and which maximizes the information of the training dataset (Molinaro, Simon, & Pfeiffer, 
2005). We preformed this analysis for the models in which the quadratic terms were significant 
(i.e., the four transformational factors and three instrumental factors in Table 2). The mean of the 
MAEs (mean absolute errors of prediction) for the full model was .3329; it was .3700 for the 
model without intelligence (i.e., an increase in prediction MAE of 11.16%).  
Finally, we can also examine how much better our model does than fitting noise (see 
Jacquart & Antonakis, 2015). We ran a Monte Carlo simulation, using 5,000 replications, 
  
INTELLIGENCE AND LEADERSHIP  29 
 
consisting of 38 random predictors and a quadratic term composed of one of the predictors (i.e., 
the number predictors in our models), and a random dependent variables at a sample size of 171. 
At this sample size, chance would produce an r-square of .2290 (95% CI is .2278 to .2303). As is 
evident from inspecting the regression tables, our full models did considerably better.  
Discussion 
 For the most part, the results supported our main position: The perceived use of 
prototypically effective leader behaviors or the perceived effectiveness of leaders was 
consistently found to be a curvilinear, roughly inverted-U function of intelligence, as gauged by 
performance on the Wonderlic test. The only discrepancy was that the observed peak of the 
curve was found at slightly lower scores than predicted; although this difference across all styles 
was not significant it is still interesting to discuss it in the event that others find similar (and 
significant results) in other larger samples. Instead of the expected peak at IQ 124, the peak fell 
at around 120, or about a quarter of a standard deviation lower. One possible explanation is 
simply that we overestimated the mean IQ of the leaders’ groups by 4 IQ points. Nonetheless, 
another explanation has more theoretical interest: Our initial prediction might have been falsely 
based on the assumption that the leaders would strike a balance between social-emotional and 
task-oriented goals. Yet according to Simonton’s (1985) nonlinear models, a pure social-
emotional leader would have an optimal IQ about a half standard deviation above the mean for 
the group, yielding a predicted peak of around 115. Given that the empirically observed optimum 
was located almost halfway between 115 and 124, we can suggest that this group of leaders 
placed somewhat more emphasis on the social-emotional responsibilities, but without neglecting 
the task-oriented responsibilities of their leadership position.  
Overall, our models explained large portions of the variance in leadership using the 
“usual suspects,” that is, individual difference factors that have stood the test of time: Personality 
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and intelligence (Antonakis, 2011). It is encouraging to see such results particularly because 
research in individual differences have been, until recently, given short shrift by researchers 
(House, Shane, & Herold, 1996). Even though many discoveries have been made in the recent 
years, researchers still lament that predicting leadership, including the factors of the full-range 
model is no easy task (e.g., Bono & Judge, 2004). However, most researchers have not included 
the key predictors alongside each other nor included very robust control variables and fixed-
effects to account for the heterogeneity of the sample. Those who have examined intelligence or 
personality have usually done so without including other known predictors, suggesting that their 
statistical models were possibly biased and underpowered; moreover, most researchers have 
failed to consider curvilinear effects or to model measurement error. Omitted variables and 
measurement error do not just attenuate coefficients; they can bias them in any direction as well 
as bias other coefficients in the estimated model. Thus, even meta-analyses (using data from 
poorly designed studies) cannot shed much light on the extent that individual differences matter 
and what their functional form is if based on data using inconsistent estimators.  
As our results show, the effect of intelligence on leadership is stronger than many think. 
Specifically, each increment in intelligence at low levels brings enormous payoffs to leaders. The 
marginal effect tapers off as intelligence scores increase, to a point of becoming negative, even 
strongly so at very high levels of intelligence. To our knowledge this is the first demonstration of 
this relation using objectively-measured intelligence and observers’ ratings of leadership.  
Recall, because we used observer ratings we argued that too highly intelligent leaders 
might not be seen as effective, even though they may be objectively effective, on the basis of 
data that is not biased by perceptions; thus, our results should not be interpreted as showing that 
a high levels of intelligence do not matter for leadership. In fact, we think that intelligence 
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matters greatly particularly for objectively-measured outcomes or at high strategic levels of 
leadership. For example, Simonton’s (2002) data show that the relationship between the 
estimated intelligence of U.S. presidents and their performance, using expert historian ratings, is 
very strong (r = .55). Correcting for unreliability in the measures of intelligence and performance 
(assumed reliability of .80 for both measures), suggests a correlation of about .69. Even 
controlling for various variables that Simonton (2002) identified to predict greatness (i.e., war 
years, assassination, scandals, and war hero), and using an errors-in-variables regression model, 
still shows a standardized beta of .54 (these are our re-analysis of Simonton’s data)2. These 
results suggest that U.S. presidents are not selected on their intelligence; in fact, factors such as 
incumbency, macroeconomic performance, and charisma appear to determine selection (Jacquart 
& Antonakis, 2015). Besides, if U.S. presidents had been selected on intelligence there would be 
range restriction on their intelligence scores, which would not correlate much with anything; 
however, that their performance on the job depends a lot on their level of intelligence indicates 
how important it is in consequential positions of leadership. More research should be conducted 
to better understand the nature of the effect of intelligence using subjective and objective 
outcomes and this across various hierarchical leader levels and across different contexts.  
Turning to some of the other findings, of note is that as with previous studies (see 
Antonakis, et al., 2003; Eagly, et al., 2003), we found that women obtained higher ratings on the 
active-constructive leadership factors and lower ratings on the passive-corrective factors. 
Because of stereotyping and the strong overlap between being male and the leadership prototype 
(Eagly & Carli, 2007), these results are probably explained by filtering mechanisms in that 
women are held to higher standards of performance (Antonakis, et al., 2010); those that attain 
positions of high status and power are therefore probably more competent than men are in 
                                                 
2
 We could not examine nonlinear effects given the small sample size of this dataset (n = 41). 
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comparable positions (for a very interesting demonstration of this phenomenon, concerning 
appointments to endowed chairs see Treviño, Gomez-Mejia, Balkin, & Mixon, in press). As for 
the other results, we were surprised to see that agreeableness was such a strong predictor. Given 
that the NEO-PI scale also includes aspects of honesty-humility, as the proponents of the 
HEXACO “big six” personality model suggest (Ashton et al., 2004; Lee & Ashton, 2004, 2008), 
it would be beneficial for future research to examine the nature of this relation using scales that 
ascertain whether it is agreeableness per se or honesty that is driving our results. That said, the 
predictive utility of agreeableness may lend more support to our earlier conjecture that the 
leadership demonstrated by the sampled participants was somewhat more social-emotional than 
task-oriented. The former would obviously place a higher premium on not just agreeableness but 
perhaps even honesty and humility. In contrast, conscientiousness, which would be expected to 
have a stronger relation with task-oriented leadership, exhibited weak effects.  
Conclusion 
Naturally, because this investigation represents the first direct test of the Simonton (1985) 
predictions, much more research is necessary, using larger and more diverse samples, and ideally 
with corrections for range restriction, before we can draw any definite conclusions about the 
predicted curvilinear function and the specific location of the peak. Our conclusions are limited 
too by the fact that the sample consisted of mid-level leaders rather than company CEOs who 
might exhibit far more task-oriented than social-emotional leadership.  
We would then expect CEOs to display much higher IQ peaks than those observed here, 
as well more conscientiousness and less agreeableness! In partial support for this conjecture, 
recent research suggests that leaders in the top 1% of general intelligence are disproportionately 
represented among Fortune 500 CEOs (Wai & Rindermann, 2015). Hence, leadership at the 
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entrepreneurial apex might even exhibit a positive monotonic even if nonlinear association with 
intelligence (cf. Model 1 in Simonton, 1985).  
We trust too that our research will also help settle some thorny issues that have spilled 
over into popular outlets about the apparent lack of predictive validity of IQ (Gladwell, 2008), 
resulting in some strong critiques (Pinker, 2009). For instance in his enormously popular book 
Outliers, Gladwell (2008, p. 88) suggests that “Once someone has reached an IQ of somewhere 
around 120, having additional IQ points doesn’t seem to translate into any measurable real-world 
advantage.” This insight of Gladwell is very interesting, even prescient given the results we 
report with respect to the 120 inflection point; however, his suggestions require tempering. As 
mentioned by Pinker in critiquing Outliers “The common thread in Gladwell’s writing is a kind 
of populism, which seeks to undermine the ideals of talent, intelligence and analytical prowess in 
favor of luck, opportunity, experience and intuition.” What did Gladwell get wrong? Gladwell 
cites Jensen (1980) to support his argument that IQ is “relatively unimportant” as a predictor 
beyond 120 points. However, this argument can be explained by one of two reasons: As 
Simonton’s (1985) Model 1 shows, an increase in IQ leads to the diminishing effects 
phenomenon, which is precisely suggested by Jensen (1980 p. 114) who notes: “a 30-point IQ 
difference is more significant between IQs of 70 and 100 than between IQs of 130 and 160.” 
Thus, it is not that high IQ does not matter, but that it matters less at higher scores. Also, if 
studying restricted populations (i.e., objectively successful CEOs), IQ will obviously play no role 
in predicting performance in that restricted population; to predict variance in an outcome there 
must be variance in the outcome and the predictor (cf. Denrell, 2003). 
Insofar as leadership success as a criterion is concerned, Gladwell’s suggestions are naïve 
because they ignore the complexity of leadership; perceptions and objective criteria are not 
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isomorphic. If the criterion is mostly task oriented, Model 1 will best explain leadership success. 
If the criterion includes social-emotional needs of followers where rater perceptions matter, then 
Model 4 is most relevant bearing in mind the average IQ of the group led. The choice of the 
optimum intelligence is contingent on the demands of a given leadership position and thus must 
be determined on a case by case basis. There's no one size fits all, unlike the linear hypothesis.  
To conclude, Sheldon Cooper, the genius physicist from “The Big Bang Theory” TV 
series is often portrayed as being detached and distant from normal folk, particularly because of 
his use of complex language and arguments. However, as Model 4 would suggest, Sheldon could 
still be a leader—if he can find a group of followers smart enough to appreciate his prose! 
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Table 1: Correlation Matrix for Individual Differences with MLQ and Instrumental Leader Scales  
          M           SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
            
 Alpha   - .96 .85 .92 .89 .87 .86 .90 
 M   .26 38.35 25.87 36.56 72.35 63.58 38.32 60.04 
 SD   .44 6.38 6.27 25.27 23.40 25.90 25.64 25.57 
1 Female  .27 .45 - -.19 -.12 -.02 -.02 .14 -.18 .00 
2 Age 36.64 5.78 -.25 .98 .08 -.06 -.13 -.03 .14 .00 
3 IQ 25.31 6.22 -.12 .10 .85 .17 -.23 .07 -.01 -.18 
4 Neuroticism 34.99 24.37 -.08 -.06 .11 .92 -.38 -.13 -.19 -.38 
5 Extraversion 76.43 21.74 .07 -.21 -.18 -.21 .89 .38 .12 .21 
6 Openness  62.74 25.77 .11 -.09 .09 -.19 .42 .87 -.04 -.06 
7 Agreeableness 40.39 25.57 -.21 .23 .04 -.14 .08 .03 .86 .09 
8 Conscientiousness 62.56 26.16 .00 .03 -.15 -.27 .11 -.04 .04 .90 
9 Idealized-influence attr.  2.79 .42 .14 .10 .12 -.04 .13 .14 .26 .05 
10 Idealized-influence beh. 2.63 .42 .06 .36 .12 -.05 .01 .01 .17 .10 
11 Inspirational motivation 2.82 .44 -.05 .17 .11 -.08 .23 .12 .17 .00 
12 Intellectual stimulation 2.66 .38 .02 .06 .16 .03 .05 .09 .21 -.01 
13 Individualized consid. 2.47 .44 .10 .14 .14 -.08 .13 .11 .21 .00 
14 Contingent rewards 2.76 .40 .16 .24 .13 .04 .02 .05 .11 .04 
15 Mgt. -by-exc. active 2.07 .50 .06 .13 -.07 .05 -.13 -.10 -.07 .23 
16 Mgt. -by-exc. passive 1.02 .38 -.12 .23 .06 .01 -.16 -.21 -.15 -.14 
17 Laissez-faire  .66 .36 -.25 .01 -.11 -.08 .02 .01 -.09 -.08 
18 Environ. monitoring 2.99 .33 .07 .07 .04 .02 .07 .01 .16 .00 
19 Strategy formulation 2.69 .46 .08 .21 .18 .07 -.03 -.02 .12 .07 
20 Path-goal facilitation 2.57 .43 .08 .16 .07 .07 .02 .07 .13 .06 
21 Outcome monitoring 2.29 .52 .06 .27 .09 .00 -.08 -.02 .19 .02 
            
 
 
      Table 1 (continued) 
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 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 
 
 
 
 Alpha .76 .75 .85 .82 .74 .74 .79 .71 .76 .82 .88 .87 .93 
 M 2.73 2.62 2.77 2.64 2.49 2.75 2.05 1.08 .68 2.96 2.67 2.53 2.31 
 SD .43 .40 .44 .37 .43 .38 .47 .40 .38 .37 .45 .45 .51 
1 Female .14 .05 .03 .02 .08 .11 .06 -.15 -.17 .02 .10 .12 .09 
2 Age -.02 .26 .04 -.01 .05 .08 .07 .24 .12 -.05 .04 -.04 .13 
3 IQ .06 .08 .05 .14 .12 .11 -.08 .06 -.07 .01 .15 .02 .03 
4 Neuroticism -.01 -.03 -.09 .04 -.02 .03 .08 -.02 -.02 -.01 .07 .06 .01 
5 Extraversion .12 .06 .21 .01 .04 .03 -.08 -.10 -.05 .07 -.04 .02 -.03 
6 Openness  .09 .04 .08 .08 .06 -.01 -.09 -.09 .01 .05 -.04 .00 .00 
7 Agreeableness .18 .16 .14 .13 .11 .11 -.04 -.15 -.11 .13 .09 .08 .13 
8 Conscientiousness .04 .06 .04 .00 .02 .06 .14 -.11 -.10 -.01 .04 .08 .06 
9 Idealized-influence attr. .77 .69 .65 .71 .71 .71 .21 -.36 -.60 .64 .64 .61 .62 
10 Idealized-influence beh. .74 .80 .68 .62 .56 .68 .30 -.18 -.40 .51 .67 .50 .60 
11 Inspirational motivation .66 .70 .87 .53 .46 .62 .15 -.10 -.31 .42 .63 .46 .47 
12 Intellectual stimulation .74 .65 .52 .83 .68 .64 .22 -.29 -.48 .66 .65 .58 .63 
13 Individualized consid. .77 .66 .59 .67 .74 .68 .17 -.22 -.44 .55 .55 .61 .72 
14 Contingent rewards .72 .77 .62 .64 .72 .77 .35 -.26 -.56 .56 .73 .69 .71 
15 Mgt. -by-exc. active .18 .33 .11 .21 .20 .41 .82 -.14 -.23 .16 .30 .33 .35 
16 Mgt. -by-exc. passive -.29 -.07 .04 -.28 -.16 -.17 -.08 .69 .54 -.35 -.24 -.27 -.19 
17 Laissez-faire  -.59 -.44 -.21 -.52 -.50 -.57 -.23 .41 .74 -.50 -.51 -.58 -.46 
18 Environ. monitoring .68 .62 .46 .71 .54 .57 .17 -.23 -.51 .75 .55 .51 .49 
19 Strategy formulation .71 .79 .65 .69 .65 .75 .34 -.10 -.52 .59 .87 .60 .59 
20 Path-goal facilitation .67 .65 .51 .61 .68 .78 .42 -.21 -.58 .56 .65 .87 .62 
21 Outcome monitoring .63 .68 .50 .65 .76 .76 .37 -.15 -.54 .52 .65 .72 .92 
 
                          
 
 
Note. N = 171 leaders (leader ratings collapsed from between N  = 1,276 to 1,280) reported below the diagonal. N = 379 leaders (leader ratings collapsed from 
between N = 2,896 to 2,905 raters, depending on the scale) reported above the diagonal. Reliabilities used for errors-in-variables corrections are reported on the 
diagonal (bolded) (at N = 171); note, for the instrumental leader factors, reliabilities are corrected for four items using the Spearman-Brown formula (Carmines & 
Zeller, 1979); the mean alpha at the rater level, including the two leader outcomes (satisfaction and effectiveness is .74. For N = 171, r > |.15|, p < .05; r > |.19|, p 
< .01; r > |.24|, p < .001. For N = 379, r > |.11|, p < .05; r > |.14|, p < .01; r > |.17|, p < .001. 
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Table 2: Predicting Leadership from Intelligence, Personality, Demographics (listwise sample)   
IIA IIB IM IS IC CR MBA MBP LF EM SF PG OM 
F .21** .18** .03 .05 .22** .28*** .14* -.11 -.28*** .12 .17** .12 .16** 
(2.36) (2.13) (.35) (.55) (2.41) (3.38) (1.82) (1.19) (3.22) (1.28) (2.09) (1.43) (2.14) 
Age .11 .35*** .13 .01 .19 .18* .07 .19* .11 .27** .08 .08 .12 
(1.00) (3.39) (1.24) (.05) (1.62) (1.72) (.76) (1.66) (1.00) (2.34) (.74) (.84) (1.32) 
N .01 -.01 -.05 .01 -.05 .03 -.02 -.04 -.01 -.00 .12 .04 -.02 
(.07) (.07) (.49) (.12) (.44) (.36) (.26) (.37) (.08) (.02) (1.29) (.48) (.29) 
E .18 .21* .43*** .01 .25* .14 -.07 .10 .02 .09 .14 .15 .04 
(1.46) (1.73) (3.61) (.11) (1.95) (1.22) (.63) (.80) (.19) (.67) (1.25) (1.31) (.39) 
O .08 -.04 -.02 .25** -.09 .07 -.03 -.38*** -.07 .04 -.06 .09 -.01 
(.66) (.37) (.20) (2.10) (.67) (.59) (.29) (2.88) (.58) (.33) (.51) (.82) (.09) 
A  .42*** .24** .17* .35*** .36*** .16 -.03 -.33*** -.23** .28** .35*** .26*** .25*** 
(4.05) (2.37) (1.66) (3.50) (3.23) (1.57) (.31) (2.93) (2.24) (2.53) (3.49) (2.64) (2.76) 
C  .03 .08 -.08 .10 -.09 .04 .14* -.23** -.25*** -.05 .17* .10 -.01 
(.33) (.86) (.88) (1.09) (.92) (.47) (1.65) (2.26) (2.69) (.50) (1.91) (1.14) (.07) 
IQ .38** .31* .28* .34** .38** .13 .10 -.08 -.09 .30* .40** .24 .04 
(2.30) (1.93) (1.72) (2.18) (2.17) (.85) (.68) (.45) (.55) (1.72) (2.52) (1.58) (.29) 
IQ2 -.39*** -.25** -.23* -.25** -.31** -.19 -.13 .13 .08 -.36*** -.31** -.32*** -.17 
(2.93) (1.98) (1.76) (2.02) (2.24) (1.56) (1.18) (.90) (.61) (2.61) (2.51) (2.63) (1.48) 
R2I .30 .31 .20 .15 .25 .27 .16 .28 .22 .15 .24 .19 .21 
R2C .37 .40 .26 .36 .36 .50 .58 .38 .45 .36 .36 .39 .44 
R2F .61 .55 .43 .54 .55 .61 .63 .58 .58 .52 .52 .53 .52 
R2P .37 .47 .45 .38 .44 .45 .37 .41 .34 .39 .45 .31 .32 
R2N .52 .51 .39 .49 .48 .59 .62 .57 .58 .45 .45 .47 .51 
∆ .07 .16 .25 .23 .19 .18 .22 .13 .12 .23 .21 .13 .11 
Note. N = 171 leaders; z-statistics in parentheses . ***p < .01, **p < .05, * p < .10. Estimates are standardized. F = female, N = Neuroticism, E = Extraversion, O 
= Openness, A = Agreeableness, C = Conscientiousness, IQ = WPT scores. IIA = idealized-influence attributes, IIB = idealized-influence behaviors, IM = 
inspirational motivation, IS = intellectual stimulation, IC = individualized consideration, CR = contingent rewards, MBA = management-by-exception active, 
MBP = management-by-exception passive, LF = laissez-faire leadership, EM = environmental monitoring, SF = strategy formulation, PG = path-goal facilitation, 
OM = outcome monitoring. The regression equations include company, country and time fixed-effects. R2I = R-square from leader individual differences only 
(i.e., demographics, personality, and intelligence); R2C = R-square contribution from fixed-effects controls; R2F = R-square from full equation. R2P = R-square 
from the panel model using only leader fixed-effects dummy variables as predictors (reported for comparison purposes); and R2N = R-square excluding IQ and 
IQ2. ∆ = difference between R2P and R2I.  
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Table 3: Predicting Leadership from Intelligence, Personality, Demographics (full sample)  
IIA IIB IM IS IC CR MBA MBP LF EM SF PG OM 
F .18** .13* .09 .03 .12 .16** .06 -.13* -.18** .01 .17** .15** .06 
(2.34) (1.85) (1.35) (.38) (1.46) (2.23) (.89) (1.75) (2.42) (.08) (2.33) (2.07) (1.00) 
Age .13 .33*** .07 .08 .21** .10 .09 .14 .12 .12 .10 .09 .12* 
(1.39) (3.94) (.91) (.92) (2.12) (1.21) (1.19) (1.58) (1.38) (1.21) (1.14) (.99) (1.65) 
N .00 .02 -.07 -.02 -.07 .00 -.00 -.11 -.06 -.07 .06 .01 -.03 
(.02) (.19) (.96) (.21) (.73) (.05) (.04) (1.30) (.68) (.85) (.80) (.17) (.38) 
E .20* .21** .33*** .04 .09 .12 .03 -.07 -.10 .09 .16 .13 -.05 
(1.84) (2.09) (3.54) (.39) (.78) (1.18) (.29) (.66) (.98) (.81) (1.57) (1.17) (.51) 
O .03 .03 -.01 .14 -.00 -.03 -.08 -.16* .00 .06 -.08 -.04 .07 
(.33) (.28) (.10) (1.52) (.02) (.34) (1.05) (1.73) (.00) (.59) (.84) (.41) (.92) 
A  .21** .16** .09 .20** .15* .08 -.06 -.26*** -.18** .15* .18** .12 .08 
(2.52) (2.16) (1.27) (2.51) (1.76) (1.06) (.88) (3.41) (2.40) (1.82) (2.38) (1.42) (1.13) 
C  -.02 .03 -.06 .01 -.04 .04 .06 -.16** -.15** -.08 .06 .06 .02 
(.21) (.45) (.88) (.20) (.45) (.59) (.88) (2.16) (2.03) (.96) (.87) (.73) (.37) 
IQ .37* .28 .20 .43** .39* .11 .07 -.20 -.16 .34 .38** .33* -.03 
(1.85) (1.50) (1.11) (2.25) (1.91) (.56) (.40) (.97) (.73) (1.59) (2.05) (1.67) (.17) 
IQ2 -.47*** -.26 -.19 -.36** -.44*** -.26 -.14 .19 .16 -.49*** -.38** -.47*** -.24 
(2.80) (1.64) (1.23) (2.21) (2.60) (1.48) (.91) (1.05) (.85) (2.75) (2.34) (2.77) (1.60) 
R2I .20 .21 .12 .11 .15 .18 .09 .22 .16 .13 .20 .17 .15 
R2C .27 .28 .21 .22 .22 .29 .43 .26 .19 .20 .23 .22 .28 
R2F .45 .42 .32 .36 .35 .36 .46 .40 .29 .35 .34 .35 .35 
R2P .39 .45 .43 .35 .39 .40 .37 .44 .41 .44 .39 .36 .30 
R2N .34 .38 .30 .28 .25 .33 .45 .38 .27 .23 .26 .24 .30 
∆ .19 .24 .31 .24 .24 .22 .28 .22 .25 .31 .20 .19 .16 
Note. N = 379 leaders; z-statistics in parentheses (interested readers can use this information to calculate confidence intervals as follows:  ± 1 ∗ 1.96). ***p < 
.01, **p < .05, * p < .10. Estimates are standardized. F = female, N = Neuroticism, E = Extraversion, O = Openness, A = Agreeableness, C = Conscientiousness, 
IQ = WPT scores. IIA = idealized-influence attributes, IIB = idealized-influence behaviors, IM = inspirational motivation, IS = intellectual stimulation, IC = 
individualized consideration, CR = contingent rewards, MBA = management-by-exception active, MBP = management-by-exception passive, LF = laissez-faire 
leadership, EM = environmental monitoring, SF = strategy formulation, PG = path-goal facilitation, OM = outcome monitoring. The regression equations include 
company, country and time fixed-effects. R2I = R-square from leader individual differences only (i.e., demographics, personality, and intelligence); R2C = R-
square contribution from fixed-effects controls; R2F = R-square from full equation. R2P = R-square from the panel model using only leader fixed-effects dummy 
variables as predictors (reported for comparison purposes); and R2N = R-square excluding IQ and IQ2. ∆ = difference between R2P and R2I. 
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Table 4: Probing the Interaction: Predicting Leadership from Intelligence  
 
  
  
  
   
  
Dependent var.  
Peak  
(WPT) 
Peak  
(IQ) 
Slope at 
WPT = 23  
(IQ = 106) 
Slope of at mean 
WPT = 25.31  
(IQ = 111) 
Slope at 
WPT = 32.5  
(IQ = 124) 
Slope at 
WPT = 35  
(IQ = 128) 
  
 
 
   
 
 
 
   
 
IIA 29.56 119 .67*** .38** -.51** -.82** 
   (2.76) (2.30) (2.20) (2.52) 
IIB. 30.54 121 .50** .31* -.27 -.48 
   (2.13) (1.93) (1.22) (1.51) 
IM 30.55 121 .45* .28* -.25 -.43 
   (1.89) (1.72) (1.08) (1.34) 
IS 31.09 122 .53** .34** -.24 -.45 
   (2.31) (2.18) (1.09) (1.43) 
IC 30.52 121 .61** .38** -.34 -.59* 
   (2.40) (2.17) (1.39) (1.72) 
EM 28.87 118 .57** .30* -.53** -.82** 
   (2.23) (1.72) (2.19) (2.40) 
SF 30.71 121 .63 .40** -.33 -.58* 
   (2.75)*** (2.52) (1.49) (1.88) 
PG 28.56 117 .48 .24 -.49** -.75** 
 
  (2.15)** (1.58) (2.32) (2.50) 
 
  
   
 
Mean 30.05 120 .55*** .33** -.37* -.61** 
 
  (2.79) (2.42) (1.96) (2.39) 
 
Robustness checks 
TF 30.36 121 .61*** .37** -.35 -.60** 
 
  (2.67) (2.39) (1.62) (1.98) 
IL  28.87 118 .51** .27* -.48** -.74** 
 
  (2.34) (1.80) (2.30) (2.53) 
SAT 29.74 119 .70*** .41** -.50** -.82** 
 
  (2.98) (2.53) (2.23) (2.60) 
EFF 29.47 119 .44** .25* -.34 -.54* 
 
  (2.00) (1.66) (1.62) (1.85) 
              
 
Note. z-statistics in parentheses. Entries in second column are rounded. For coefficients reporting in “Mean”, test are 
based on the linear combinations of parameters using the delta method (Oehlert, 1992). Tangent slope estimates are 
standardized.  N = 171; ***p < .01, **p < .05, * p < .10. IIA = idealized-influence attributes, IIB = idealized-
influence behaviors, IM = inspirational motivation, IS = intellectual stimulation, IC = individualized consideration, 
CR = contingent rewards, MBA = management-by-exception active, MBP = management-by-exception passive, LF 
= laissez-faire leadership, EM = environmental monitoring, SF = strategy formulation, PG = path-goal facilitation, 
OM = outcome monitoring, TF = Transformational leadership (index of transformational leadership scales), IL = 
Instrumental leadership (index of instrumental leadership scales); SAT = Satisfaction, EFF = effectiveness. 
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Figure 1. Distribution of observed intelligence scores. The dashed curve is the normal distribution; the 
solid curve is a kernel density estimate (Kernel = Epanechnikov, bandwidth = 1.91). The Doornik-
Hansen (2008) normality test indicated a slight departure from normality, χ2(2) =  7.12, p =  0.03. 
Note, the skewness value is .49 and that of Kurtosis 3.22 (compared to the normal distributional 
values of 0 and 3 respectively). The skewness test for normality was significant (p = .01), but not that 
of kurtosis (p = .41); the joint test was significant, and provided the same inference as the normality 
test (p = .03). 
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Panel A 
 
Panel B 
 
 Panel C 
 
Panel D 
 
Figure 2. The curvilinear relation of intelligence with leadership. Because several data points are on top of each other and only visible as one 
point, we used Stata’s “jitter” option to add some random noise (7% of graphical area) to each data point.
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Appendix Table 1: Predicting Leadership from Intelligence, Personality, Demographics, and omitting Fixed-effects (full sample)   
IIA IIB IM IS IC CR MBA MBP LF EM SF PG OM 
                            
F .25*** .18*** .11* .06 .17** .23*** .07 -.16** -.25*** .06 .21*** .18*** .17*** 
(3.78) (2.90) (1.88) (.98) (2.52) (3.47) (1.18) (2.49) (4.00) (.87) (3.22) (2.77) (2.79) 
Age .07 .38*** .11 .02 .13* .19** .11* .26*** .08 .01 .15** .07 .22*** 
(.95) (5.67) (1.58) (.26) (1.75) (2.57) (1.65) (3.86) (1.08) (.12) (2.01) (.95) (3.26) 
N .09 .07 .00 .06 -.00 .11 .17** -.17** -.12 -.00 .09 .12 .04 
(1.10) (.97) (.07) (.75) (.05) (1.30) (2.32) (2.18) (1.52) (.02) (1.21) (1.53) (.60) 
E .23** .19** .33*** .04 .12 .20** -.07 -.03 -.15 .10 .13 .10 .03 
(2.43) (2.10) (3.75) (.46) (1.22) (2.07) (.75) (.31) (1.58) (1.03) (1.41) (1.10) (.36) 
O -.01 -.04 -.08 .07 -.01 -.13 -.04 -.12 .10 .00 -.14* -.05 -.03 
(.17) (.48) (.96) (.85) (.12) (1.49) (.53) (1.51) (1.24) (.04) (1.70) (.59) (.37) 
A  .25*** .17** .14** .18*** .15** .15** -.03 -.28*** -.19*** .17** .13** .13* .16** 
(3.79) (2.55) (2.22) (2.73) (2.18) (2.19) (.45) (4.42) (2.89) (2.54) (1.99) (1.93) (2.50) 
C  .04 .07 -.02 .04 .03 .09 .23*** -.17** -.15** -.03 .09 .12* .08 
(.58) (1.02) (.29) (.50) (.35) (1.25) (3.42) (2.48) (2.13) (.48) (1.25) (1.81) (1.20) 
IQ .28** .24** .22* .27** .32** .33*** -.10 -.01 -.25** .18 .38*** .23* .18* 
(2.23) (1.99) (1.90) (2.35) (2.56) (2.79) (.85) (.11) (1.98) (1.32) (3.54) (1.94) (1.67) 
IQ2 -.29** -.22* -.16 -.24** -.31** -.30** -.01 .10 .17 -.34*** -.37*** -.37*** -.33*** 
(2.31) (1.81) (1.32) (2.10) (2.46) (2.48) (.13) (.72) (1.31) (2.61) (3.33) (3.20) (2.99) 
              
R2F .20 .21 .12 .11 .15 .18 .09 .22 .16 .13 .20 .17 .15 
              
Note. N = 379 leaders using the maximum likelihood estimator for missing data; z-statistics in parentheses. ***p < .01, **p < .05, * p < .10. Estimates are standardized. F = 
female, N = Neuroticism, E = Extraversion, O = Openness, A = Agreeableness, C = Conscientiousness, IQ = WPT scores. IIA = idealized-influence attributes, IIB = 
idealized-influence behaviors, IM = inspirational motivation, IS = intellectual stimulation, IC = individualized consideration, CR = contingent rewards, MBA = management-
by-exception active, MBP = management-by-exception passive, LF = laissez-faire leadership, EM = environmental monitoring, SF = strategy formulation, PG = path-goal 
facilitation, OM = outcome monitoring. The regression equations exclude company, country and time fixed-effects. R2 = R-square from full equation.  
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Appendix Table 2: Predicting Leadership “Super Scales” and Outcomes from Intelligence, Personality, Demographics, and Fixed-effects 
 
Var TF1 IL1 SAT1 EFF1 TF2 IL2 SAT2 EFF2 
                
Female .15* .17** .22** .15* .14* .14* .13 .13** 
(1.82) (2.15) (2.52) (1.84) (1.95) (1.82) (1.61) (1.98) 
Age .17* .15 .25** .11 .20** .14 .16 .08 
(1.72) (1.50) (2.36) (1.17) (2.26) (1.57) (1.57) (.99) 
Neuroticism -.02 .04 -.00 .05 -.04 -.01 -.01 .03 
(-.21) (.46) (-.03) (.60) (.52) (.11) (-.15) (.37) 
Extraversion .24** .12 .06 -.02 .22** .10 .08 .06 
(2.14) (1.09) (.50) (-.16) (2.12) (.96) (.72) (.62) 
Openness .03 .01 .10 .16 .02 -.01 .04 .02 
(.27) (.13) (.81) (1.47) (.17) (.07) (.40) (.25) 
Agreeableness .33*** .33*** .30*** .35*** .18** .15* .26*** .19** 
(3.42) (3.48) (2.95) (3.69) (2.29) (1.88) (2.94) (2.55) 
Conscientiousness .00 .07 -.01 .13 -.03 .02 -.00 .10 
(.04) (.82) (-.08) (1.55) (.38) (.27) (-.00) (1.41) 
IQ .37** .27* .41** .25* .42** .31 .46** .30* 
(2.39) (1.80) (2.53) (1.66) (2.31) (1.59) (2.29) (1.71) 
IQ2 -.31** -.33*** -.40*** -.25** -.40*** -.47*** -.54*** -.35** 
(2.54) (2.74) (3.09) (2.14) (2.70) (3.03) (3.24) (2.35) 
         
R-square .49 .57 .58 .56 .37 .28 .39 .40 
     
  
  
 
Note. The first set of estimates (subscripted “1”), are based on the listwise deletion sample (n = 171); the second set of estimates (subscripted “2”), use the full sample (n = 
379). To ensure maximum efficiency, the rest of the leader styles (contingent rewards, management-by-exception active and passive, and laissez-faire leadership) were also 
included in the models; z-statistics in parentheses. ***p < .01, **p < .05, * p < .10. Estimates are standardized. IQ = WPT scores. TF = Transformational leadership (index 
consisting of idealized-influence attributes, idealized-influence behaviors, inspirational motivation, intellectual stimulation, individualized consideration), IL = Instrumental 
leadership (index consisting of environmental monitoring, strategy formulation, path-goal facilitation, outcome monitoring), SAT = satisfaction, EFF = effectiveness. The 
regression equations include company, country and time fixed-effects. R2 = R-square from full equation. 
